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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE LOUISIANA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT:
A CIVILIAN ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
In the 1988 regular legislative session, the legislature enacted a body
of products liability law for Louisiana. This new legislation, called the
"Louisiana Products Liability Act," ' is now the exclusive basis of man-
ufacturer liability for damages caused by their products.' As is common
with any newly enacted legislation, a decision must be made concerning
the retroactive or prospective application of the Act. This dilemma will
surface when a claimant sues on a cause of action that arose before
September 1, 1988, the effective date of the Act. Since the Act, as
passed by the Louisiana legislature and signed into effect by the Gov-
ernor, does not expressly state whether it should be applied prospectively
or retroactively, it will be up to the courts to decide this issue.
The purpose of this comment is to determine whether the new
products liability law should be applied retroactively to causes of action
that arose before September 1, 1988. The discussion is divided into five
sections. The first section identifies the procedure that should be used
in making the determination of whether or not newly enacted legislation
can be applied retroactively. The second section examines the intent of
the legislature with respect to retroactive application of the new Act.
The third section analyzes the effect of the new Act on prior Louisiana
law in the area of products liability. This section lists the elements and
causes of action that existed before the new legislation and examines
six possible conflicts between new and old law. The fourth section
presents Louisiana jurisprudence that has interpreted issues of retroactive
application of newly enacted statutes. This section examines cases holding
that enacted statutes could be applied retroactively, as well as those that
allowed only prospective application of new statutes. The final section
of this comment asserts the conclusion that the new Act should be
applied retroactively.
DETERMINING RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
A two-step analysis is used in this comment to examine whether the
Act should be applied retroactively. The first question is whether there
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. R.S. 9:2800.51-2800.59 (Supp. 1989).
2. La. R.S. 9:2800.52 (Supp. 1989).
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is a legislative expression concerning the application of the Act. If there
is, then the Act will be applied accordingly. If there is not, the second
question is whether the Act is substantive, interpretive, or procedural
within the meaning of article 6 of the Louisiana Civil Code.'
The first question is whether the legislature expressly provided for
the retroactive application of the new Act. This question is answered
by examining the specific language of the Act. The legislature, in this
instance, did not expressly provide for the retroactive application of the
Act. Since the final version of the Act did not include this type of
expression, the next inquiry in this analysis will be to determine the
proper classification of the new Act in accordance with article 6 of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
Article 6 of the Louisiana Civil Code contains the residual rule of
retroactive and prospective application. The article provides that "sub-
stantive" laws prescribe for the future only. Laws that can be termed
as "procedural" or "interpretive" are applied both prospectively and
retroactively unless there exists legislative expression to the contrary.4 It
3. La. S. No. 684, amend, number 9 (May 25, 1988). In theory, however, a third
step should also be employed for this analysis. See comment (b) to article 6 of the
Louisiana Civil Code. The Constitution controls the outer-limits of the retroactive ap-
plication of laws. See also Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, La., 603 F.
Supp. 1125 (E.D. La. 1985). A law cannot be applied retroactively if it divests vested
substantive rights. The theoretical third step, that the ultimate test for retroactive appli-
cation of legislation is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, can arise in one of three ways. First, the rights granted under
a state law might be more protective than those secured under the United States Con-
stitution. There would never be a constitutional problem in this situation since anything
allowed under state law would necessarily be allowed under the constitution.
Second, the state law analysis and the constitutional analysis dealing with the possible
retroactive application of legislation might be identical. Under this type of analysis, the
same considerations are applied in determining whether a law is substantive under state
law and under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. It is this author's belief that the Louisiana courts have followed this type
of analysis, equating the due process analysis with the article 6 analysis.
Third, state law might exclude or grant more rights than allowed by the constitution.
This would mean the state courts conduct their analysis totally independent of the con-
stitutional ramifications. Although this does not seem to be the trend by Louisiana courts,
this scenario could become very important to this type of discussion. If the due process
requirement ever becomes more restrictive than those of the state, then this third step in
the analysis-the constitutional step-will have to be conducted.
It is this author's belief that at present Louisiana courts equate the constitutional due
process analysis with the article 6 analysis when interpreting this issue. This comment
proceeds on that assumption. If the requirements change to the effect of more protection
being secured under the Constitution than article 6, further investigation will have to be
conducted. At present, however, that divergence is beyond the scope of this comment.
4. Louisiana Civil Code article 6 provides "in the absence of contrary legislative
expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws
apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the
contrary."
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is well settled in Louisiana jurisprudence that procedural and interpretive
laws will be applied both prospectively and retroactively unless the
legislature has provided otherwise.' A substantive law creates, defines,
and regulates rights and obligations.' By contrast, a procedural or in-
terpretive law prescribes a method of obtaining redress or enforcing
rights and obligations created by substantive laws. 7 Such laws do not
establish new rights, but merely establish the meaning that rights had
from the time of their creation.8
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PASSAGE OF THE NEW PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACT
The first question that must be resolved when examining the possible
retroactive application of the new Act is to determine whether a legislative
expression directs its application. In this case, the question will be
whether the legislature expressly stated that the Act is to be applied
retroactively or only prospectively. If no legislative expression is found
then the analysis proceeds to the second step, determining whether the
law is substantive, procedural, or interpretive within the meaning of
article 6 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
As originally introduced, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.58, sec-
tion 2 stated that the Act would "become effective on September 1,
1988." 9 At a subsequent Senate committee meeting, an amendment
inserted the following language: "and shall apply to causes of action
sustained on or after that date."' 0 This express prohibition in the statute
itself would have prevented the courts from applying the Act retroac-
tively." Later in the legislative session, however, the full Senate deleted
the amendment 2 and reinstated only the original language, placing the
effective date of the Act on September 1, 1988. The final form of the
Act makes no mention of causes of action arising on, after, or before
that date.
The legislature did not bar retroactivity when it could have easily
done so. This legislative history indicates that the legislature did not
5. La. Civ. Code art. 6 comment (c); Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indem.
Co., 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978); Barron v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 397 So. 2d 29
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 401 So. 2d 1188 (1981).
6. Black's Law Dictionary 1281 (5th ed. 1979).
7. Id. at 1083.
8. Coates v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 444 So. 2d 788, 790 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1984).
9. Orig. La. S. No. 684; proposed as La. R.S. 9:2800.58, p. 7, line 1.
10. La. S. No. 684, amend, no. 50 (May 17, 1988).
11. La. Civ. Code art. 6. The legislature can expressly prohibit retroactive application
of otherwise retroactive laws that are interpretive or procedural.
12. La. S. No. 684, amend. no. 9 (May 25, 1988).
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intend to exclude the possibility of retroactive application of the new
Act. By rejecting the language that would have made the Act operate
prospectively only, the legislature has placed the burden on the courts
to decide this issue.
Absent legislative expression concerning the retroactive application
of the Act, the Act must be classified under article 6 in order to determine
if the Act can apply retroactively. 3 Since the legislative intent is a
valuable guide in this classification process, further examination of the
legislative history is warranted.
The new products liability law was presented at a committee meeting
as one of a number of tort reform bills. 14 Senator Hainkel, who presented
the bill, told the committee that the main purpose of the bill was to
cure the problems created by the Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
decision: 5
I would simply like to say that with the advent of a decision
which we all in legal circles know as Halphen, we got out of
the ... mainstream of the legalistic system in this country.
Traditionally, there were four ways whereby a product could be
defective or an injured person could recover. This decision . . .
added a fifth way which I consider to be unfair, unreasonable,
and illogical, and the main aspect of this bill, frankly, is to go
back to the traditional four matters whereby a product was
defective and there could be recovery . . . [tihat's the meat of
the bill.' 6
Based on this and other explanations of the bill at this committee
meeting,' 7 it is clear that this bill was a means of overruling the Halphen
decision and replacing it with the products liability law that has tra-
ditionally been recognized in Louisiana.
THE EFFECT OF THE ACT ON PRIOR LAW
Since there is no legislative expression on the retroactive application
of the Act, the analysis centers on the classification of the Act according
to Article 6 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Will it be seen as substantive,
in which case it could not have retroactive application, or will it be
deemed to be procedural or interpretive, in which case retroactivity
would not be precluded? This section of the comment examines whether
13. See infra text and accompanying note 3.
14. New Products Liability Act: Minutes of Committee Meetings on Act 684 Before
Senate Committee on Judiciary A, 1988 Sess. (May 17, 1988) [hereinafter Minutes].
15. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
16. Minutes, supra note 14, at 3.
17. Minutes, supra note 14.
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the Act either creates or eliminates vested substantive rights. The most
logical means of analyzing this question is to outline briefly what prod-
ucts liability law of Louisiana consisted of before the new Act, and
then to analyze the effect of the Act on this prior law.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Weber v. Fidelity and Casualty
Insurance Co. of New York"s outlined a structure for Louisiana products
liability that has been continuously accepted, reaffirmed, and applied
by the courts in Louisiana. 9 Explaining the rights against a manufacturer,
the court stated that a manufacturer was liable to any person who
sustained an injury because of a defect in the design, composition, or
manufacture of an article if the injury might reasonably have been
anticipated. 20 The claimant, said the court, bore the burden of proof
that the injury-causing product was "unreasonably dangerous to normal
use" and that this defective condition caused the injury. 2' It was not
necessary to show specific instances of negligence because a manufacturer
was presumed to know of the defects or vices in the things it made. 22
The state of products liability law changed significantly in 1986,
when the Louisiana Supreme Court responded to a certified question
from the Fifth Circuit in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.23 In
Halphen, a widow sued an asbestos manufacturer for the wrongful death
of her husband, who died as a result of his exposure to asbestos. A
judgment was rendered against the defendant-manufacturer in the District
Court. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to
the Louisiana Supreme Court: "In a strict products liability case, may
a manufacturer be held liable for injuries caused by an unreasonably
dangerous product if the manufacturer establishes that it did not know
and reasonably could not have known of the inherent danger posed by
its product?" 24 Answering this question in the affirmative, the Louisiana
Supreme Court not only expanded the recognized theories of products
liability, but also established a new theory, the unreasonably dangerous
per se theory.25 Under any theory, "the plaintiff must prove that the
harm resulted from the condition of the product, that the condition
made the product unreasonably dangerous to normal use and that the
18. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
19. Harris v. Atlanta Stove Works, Inc., 428 So. 2d 1040 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 434 So. 2d 1106 (1983); Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980);
Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
20. Id. at 602, 250 So. 2d at 755.
21. Id. at 603, 250 So. 2d at 756.
22. Id.
23. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).




condition existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's con-
trol.' 26
Under the unreasonably dangerous per se theory, liability was im-
posed on a manufacturer simply on the basis of the product's char-
acteristics, regardless of the manufacturer's knowledge, intent, or conduct.
The product was unreasonably dangerous per se if a reasonable person
would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the product, whether fore-
seeable or not, outweighed the product's utility. 27 The state of scientific
knowledge and existing technology were irrelevant to the question of
liability under this type of theory. 28 In other words, a manufacturer was
liable for injuries caused by his product even though it was impossible,
at the time the product was manufactured, to discover a possible risk
or hazard in light of existing technology.
Regardless of the prior law, only products liability theories outlined
in the new Act are available against the manufacturer for claims arising
after September 1, 1988. The issues concerning the retroactive application
of the new Act will become relevant only when the claim sued on arose
before this date and the new Act conflicts with prior law. In order to
illustrate these issues, the new Act must be compared to the preexisting
products liability law.
Comparing the new Act to prior law in this area, six potential
conflicts exist, and each must be closely scrutinized to ascertain its effect
on previously recognized law. The six critical elements of the new Act
are: i) manufacturer liability based on an inadequate warning; ii) man-
ufacturer liability based on the failure to conform to an express warranty;
iii) the unavailability of attorney's fees; iv) a more stringent burden of
proof; v) the specific provision for a state-of-the-art defense; and iv)
the exclusivity clause of the new Act, which eliminates the unreasonably
dangerous per se theory. The fifth and sixth elements will prove to be
the most problematic issues of the Act for this comment because both
lie in direct conflict with the analysis and interpretation enunciated in
Halphen.
For this type of analysis to be successful, each of these six areas
must be examined in relation to prior law for the purpose of determining
whether any vested substantive rights are eliminated or created by the
Act. If any of these six areas are shown to violate vested rights, then
the Act cannot be applied retroactively.
First, the Act specifies that a claimant can recover from a manu-
facturer when a product is unreasonably dangerous because of an in-
adequate warning.29 The question becomes whether or not a new theory
26. Id.
27. Id. at 114.
28. Id.
29. La. R.S. 9:2800.57 (Supp. 1989).
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of recovery is created by this provision. While no statute imposed this
duty before the Act, this specific duty can be retrieved from various
cases in our jurisprudence. Hence, the conflict between this provision
and prior law is illusory, and no retroactivity question arises.30
Second, the new Act creates a theory of recovery for failure to
conform to an express warranty.3 This cause of action was not one of
those listed in Halphen. It can, however, be directly linked to Article
231532 in that the untruthfulness of the warranty is "an act of man
that causes damage to another." For this reason, the new statutory
cause of action for nonconformity with an express warranty does not
create a new right, but merely gives a specific title to a right that has
always existed under article 2315. Again, the new law does not conflict
with the old, and no retroactivity question arises.
Third, the Act does not allow the recovery of attorneys' fees. 33
Generally, attorneys' fees are not recoverable in tort law in Louisiana.
Tort law is based on article 2315, which does not provide for attorneys'
fees. Confusion has sometimes accompanied this issue because an action
in redhibition under Louisiana Civil Code article 2545 allows the recovery
of attorneys' fees. The leading case on this issue is Philippe v. Browning
Arms Co.34 This case involved an action by Dr. Philippe to recover
damages suffered when his gun accidentally discharged and severed his
right thumb. By applying article 2545, which authorizes attorneys' fees
in redhibition cases, through article 2315 the Louisiana Supreme Court
allowed a recovery of attorneys' fees. 31 It bears emphasis that this case
did not base the award of attorneys' fees on article 2315, but on the
express grant of attorneys' fees in article 2545. The Act does not preclude
the recovery of attorneys' fees under actions sounding in redhibition,
but only prohibits the recovery of attorney's fees in an action based
solely upon the new legislation. If the facts and circumstances of a case
fit a theory of redhibition, then the courts could arguably still award
attorney's fees to a claimant on that basis. Once more, there is arguably
no direct conflict with prior law, and no retroactivity question.
Fourth, the Act makes the plaintiff's burden of proof more stringent
in certain cases. Under the design theory of the new Act, the claimant
30. Scott v. White Trucks, 699 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1983); Reed v. John Deere, 569
F. Supp. 371 (M.D. La. 1983); Straley v. Calongne Drayage and Storage, Inc., 346 So.
2d 171 (La. 1977); Lanclos v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 477 So. 2d 87 (1985); Oatis v. Catalytic, Inc., 433 So. 2d 328 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1983).
31. La. R.S. 9800.58 (Supp. 1989).
32. Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 provides "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
33. La. R.S. 9:2800.53(5) (Supp. 1989).
34. 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981).
35. Id. at 319.
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must introduce evidence of the existence of an alternative design that
was available at the time the product left the manufacturer's control . 6
Traditionally, the plaintiff's burden under a design theory had been to
show an alternative feasible design.3 7 The new standard requires the
plaintiff to prove the existence, rather than the mere feasibility, of an
alternative design under this theory. The claimant's burden of proof in
a design theory under the new Act is more stringent than it had been
under prior jurisprudence. Hence, there is an apparent conflict between
the new and the old law. Although this raises a question of retroactive
application, it is one that can be summarily disposed of. Statutes es-
tablishing burdens of proof have always been classified as procedural,
and therefore, according to article 6, should be applied retroactively
absent contrary legislative expression.3"
Clearly, the first four elements analyzed previously can be easily
eliminated from this discussion because they do not present a problem
with the retroactive application of the new Act. The first three areas
merely codify aspects of Louisiana law that were in existence before
the new Act. The fourth area creates a more stringent burden of proof,
which will not bar the retroactive application of the new Act.3 9 As a
result, these four issues can be dispensed with at this juncture.
Unfortunately, however, the last two problem areas cannot be re-
solved so easily. Both change the law and neither is procedural. Hence,
a thorough analysis must be conducted in order to determine whether
either of these two provisions, the exclusion of the category of unrea-
sonably dangerous per se and the inclusion of the state-of-the-art defense
to design cases, will serve as a bar to retroactive application of the
Act. The next section of this comment analyzes this issue and illustrates
how the courts have reacted in very similar situations concerning the
retroactive application of newly enacted statutes.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF LEGISLATION THAT RESPONDS TO A
PREVIOUS JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
In a number of cases, Louisiana courts have addressed the question
whether a statute is substantive, or instead procedural or interpretive.
The starting point of the analysis is the premise that retroactive appli-
cation of statutes is generally prohibited.4 0 Louisiana courts are compelled
to follow a true civilian analysis, the leading example of which is found
36. Crawford, The Louisiana Products Liability Act, 36 La. B.J. 173, 175 (1988).
37. Id.
38. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1339 (La. 1978).
39. Id.
40. Cahn v. Cahn, 468 So. 2d 1176, 1181 (La. 1985).
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in Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. 41 Ardoin involved
a suit for medical malpractice.4 2 On July 9, 1976, the victim died during
a coronary artery by-pass 43 operation in a Lafayette, Louisiana hospital
when air instead of blood was inadvertently pumped into his heart. The
trial court, relying on the "Locality Rule," 44 excluded a Baton Rouge
doctor's testimony on the degree of care normally exercised by members
of this medical speciality.
The question in Ardoin became whether a statute, 45 that in effect
abolished the locality rule for specialists but was enacted after the victim's
death could be applied retroactively. The statute in question contained
no legislative expression with respect to retroactivity. The supreme court,
interpreting old article 8, recognized interpretive, remedial, and proce-
dural laws as exceptions to the nonretroactivity rule 46 and held that this
statute should be applied retroactively. Laws that determine burdens of
proof or clarify existing laws, said the court, should be classified as
procedural or interpretive and accorded retroactive effects. The statute
in question, declared the Ardoin court, "is an interpretive statute which
does not establish new rights and duties but merely determines the
meaning of existing laws and may thus be applied to facts occurring
prior to its promulgation. ' 47 The court determined that even though
retroactive application of the statute changed the analysis of the case,
it did not divest anyone of any vested rights. The statute merely inter-
preted the meaning that the existing laws had at the time the damage
was sustained. The distinction between procedural laws and substantive
laws set out by Ardoin persisted in the case law and was codified in
new article 6.
Later courts have relied on Ardoin to hold that legislation enacted
in response to an erroneous judicial interpretation of a statute is inter-
pretive and can be applied retroactively. In Tullier v. Tullier,48 for
example, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a newly enacted statute
that eliminated a judicially created rule could be applied retroactively
41. 360 So. 2d 1331.
42. Id. Decedent's wife and nine children brought a wrongful death action alleging
that the negligence of various defendants caused the death of the victim.
43. Id. This type of operation requires that the patient's heart be stopped and his
respiratory and circulatory functions be performed by a "heart-lung" machine during the
surgery.
44. Id. This is a rule of law which restricts proof of medical negligence to a standard
of care that is exercised in the community where the doctor practices.
45. Id. La. R.S. 9:2794 (Supp. 1988) (the locality rule does not apply to medical
specialists).
46. 360 So. 2d at 1338 (citing 1 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, Nos. 249-52 (La.
St. L. Inst. transl. 1959)); A. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law Systems 68 (1977)).
47. 360 So. 2d at 1339.
48. 464 So. 2d 278 (La. 1985).
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because no vested substantive rights would be violated. The Tullier court
faced the issue of whether a statute eliminating the double declaration
rule49 in community property matters could be given retroactive effect.
The statute did not contain a provision regarding its prospective or
retroactive application.
The court noted that the double declaration rule had been created
by the courts. The judicially created double declaration rule, said the
court, could not have created any substantive rights of ownership in
property because the creation of rights is solely within the legislator's
power. 0 Hence, the statute eliminating the rule could be retroactively
applied because it did not destroy any vested rights.
The Tullier court relied heavily on the civilian theory that the
legislature possesses the exclusive power to create substantive rights. For
purposes of this comment, the case is most important for its articulation
of the corollary to the civilian doctrine: a jurisprudentially created rule
does not create substantive rights. Therefore, absent contrary legislative
expression, an amendment overruling a jurisprudential rule can be applied
retroactively.
An examination of the legislative intent behind the new Act, which
was presented earlier in this comment, shows that the Act was passed
in response to the effect that the Halphen decision had on Louisiana's
products liability law. This falls precisely within the rule set out by the
Tullier case and therefore retroactive application of the Act should
present no difficulty.
Other cases bolster this conclusion. Peppard v. Hilton Hotels Corp."
and Laubie v. Sonesta International Hotel Corp." are two cases in which
the application of a legislatively amended statute was at issue. The
49. Wood v. Wood, 424 So. 2d 1143, 1145-46 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982). As to
immovable property acquired by one spouse during a marriage, there is an irrebuttable
presumption that it is community property unless there exists in the act of acquisition
the couple's declaration that the property was acquired with the funds of that spouse
separately, and that it was being acquired for that spouse's individual estate.
50. 464 So. 2d at 282.
51. This is in contrast to the situation in which a legislative amendment creates
substantive rights. See Coates v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 444 So. 2d 788 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1984). In Coates, an amendment to article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil
Code creating the action for loss of consortium was not applied retroactively because the
amendment created substantive rights. The Tullier court recognized the amendment did
not create substantive rights, but merely interpreted the way that the courts should have
enforced rights at the time that the action arose. The contrast between a Tullier analysis,
where the legislature merely overrules a jurisprudential rule, and a Coates analysis, where
the legislature creates new substantive rights, is relevant for purposes of this comment
because the new Act is not the creation of new substantive rights. See infra text and
accompanying notes 29-35, 38-39, 50.
52. 482 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
53. 752 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1985).
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statute at issue in both cases was Louisiana Civil Code article 2971,
which limits the liability of landlords and innkeepers to a maximum of
five hundred dollars . 4 The legislature amended the article in 1982, and
each case addressed the effect of the amendment. In both of these cases,
the courts held that the 1982 amendment to Article 2971 was interpretive
of the law as it had existed before an aberrant supreme court decision
and thus could be applied retroactively.
In Laubie, hotel guests brought an action against a hotel to recover
for theft of jewelry valued at $50,000 from their hotel room." Because
of a Louisiana statute limiting liability to one hundred dollars, the
federal district court found an insufficient amount in the action for lack
of the controversy and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified
questions regarding the statute to the Louisiana Supreme Court5 6 which
answered that the statute did not apply to an innkeeper's delictual, as
opposed to contractual, liability." Based on this answer, the Fifth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to the lower court. 8 After the supreme
court's decision, the Louisiana legislature, in 1982, amended article 2971
to limit expressly both the contractual and delictual liability 9 to five
hundred dollars. By this amendment, the legislature overruled the earlier
supreme court's decision.
Upon remand, the federal district court faced the issue whether the
amended statute should be applied to the Laubie's claim. The court
ruled that because Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, and because the
legislative will as expressed in the Civil Code is the preeminent source
of law in Louisiana, the amended act should prevail over the Louisiana
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute. The amended statute was
found to be interpretive6° by the federal district court, which dismissed
the action once again for lack of federal jurisdiction. On the second
appeal by the plaintiffs, 6' the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision, stating,
[iun Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction, the legislative will, as
expressed in the articles of the [Civil] Code, is supreme. Case
law, although valuable, is of secondary importance. The amended
54. La. Civ. Code art. 2971.
55. 752 F.2d at 166. The Laubie's room was entered by unknown persons who broke
the chain lock on the door and stole jewelry valued at approximately $50,000.00.
56. Laubie v. Sonesta Int'l Hotel Corp., 626 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1981).
57. Laubie, 398 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1981).
58. Laubie, 650 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1981).
59. 1982 La. Acts No. 382, § 1.
60. Laubie, 587 F. Supp. 457, 459-460 (E.D. La. 1984).
61. Laubie, 752 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1985).
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Act, therefore, takes precedence over the judicial interpretation
of the statute. 62
The amendment, said the court, was aimed at overruling a judicial
interpretation that the legislature disagreed with, and at clarifying the
meaning of the statute. The amended statute was viewed as interpretive
legislation, which did not divest vested rights. In short, the 1982 amend-
ment applied retroactively.
A Louisiana court addressed the same question in Peppard. Before
the 1982 amendment to article 2791, the Peppard's room in the Hilton
Hotel was burglarized. In 1983 the trial court rendered a judgment
limiting the Peppard's recovery to five hundred dollars under article
2971. On appeal, the fourth circuit accepted the reasoning used in Laubie
and ruled that the amendment to article 2971, even though it was enacted
after the plaintiffs sustained the damage, was interpretive law and could
be applied retroactively without any violation of vested rights.
The rule of Laubie and Peppard can be applied to the question of
the retroactivity of the Louisiana Products Liability Act. The reasoning
presented in these cases can be used to urge retroactive application of
the Act. Arguably, the Act is interpretive legislation that should not be
barred from retroactive application. The legislature's enactment of the
new legislation in response to Halphen is analogous to the legislative
amendment of article 2971 after the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision
in Laubie. In both instances, the legislature defined the law as it should
have been interpreted instead of the way it was interpreted by the
Louisiana Supreme Court. No legislatively created rights were taken
away by the amendment; only a judicial interpretation was affected.
Another case, Baron v. State, Department of Public Safety,63 presents
a very clear example of interpretive legislation. In that case, the plaintiff's
license was revoked after he was adjudged a habitual offender. 64 At that
time, Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1479 placed restrictions on the ability65
of a habitual offender to secure a new driver's license. The statute listed
three restrictions, all joined by the word "and." 66 Prior to 1978, the
Louisiana Supreme Court had applied this "and" as an "or," making
the requirements disjunctive. 67 The legislature, disagreeing with the su-
preme court's interpretation of the statute, changed the wording to ensure
that a habitual offender could not regain a driver's license until all of
62. Id. at 167.
63. 397 So. 2d 29 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 401 So. 2d 1188 (1981).
64. Id. La. R.S. 32:1471-79 (Supp. 1988).
65. Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (E.D.
La. 1985).




the requirements in the statute were met.6" The amendment did not
contain a legislative expression concerning its retroactive or prospective
application, and the courts were called upon to decide the issue.
The second circuit compared the amended statute to the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision a year earlier and termed the new law "a
classical example of interpretive legislation." 69 Rights, noted the court,
do not vest because of an erroneous interpretation of a statute, and
retroactive application of interpretive amendments did not divest sub-
stantive rights. The earlier judicial interpretation of "and," said the
court, did not comply with the meaning of the statute, and the amend-
ment specified the true meaning that the statute had at the time that
the action arose. 70 The legislative intent expressed in the amended statute,
said the court, prevailed over an earlier judicial interpretation.
Taken together, these cases clearly demonstrate that the new Act
should operate retroactively. Since the elimination of a judicially created
rule does not destroy vested substantive rights, as shown in Tullier, the
elimination of the judicially created unreasonably dangerous per se rule
does not impair substantive rights. In Laubie and Peppard, the amend-
ment to Louisiana Civil Code article 2971 was given retroactive appli-
cation based on the civil law precept that the legislative will defines
substantive rights, while an erroneous judicial interpretation of a statute
does not. Likewise, the Baron case shows that legislation which responds
to erroneous judicial interpretations of a statute are to be applied ret-
roactively.
The new Act clarifies the meaning and rights that were secured
under article 2315 from its inception. This clarification defines the rights
recognized by the legislature in the area of products liability differently
than earlier judicial interpretations. Based on this analysis, there should
be no bar to retroactive application of the new Act. The issue should
be resolved in favor of the legislators' will rather than prior rules created
by the courts.
One case decided by the Louisiana courts may at first seem to
undercut this analysis. The Faucheaux v. Alton Oschner Medical Foun-
dation Hospital and Clinic7' decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court
appears to conflict with the principles just examined. The court's state-
ment that "statutes enacted after the acquisition of such a vested property
right ... cannot be retroactively applied to divest the plaintiff of his
vested right .... "72 might be interpreted as denying retroactive appli-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 31.
70. Id.
71. 470 So. 2d 878 (La. 1985).
72. Id. at 879.
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cation of legislation such as the new Act. Faucheaux was a suit against
a hospital in which the plaintiff alleged that blood transfusions during
surgery caused him to contract hepatitis. The Louisiana legislature later
enacted statutes that granted immunity to medical personnel for strict
tort liability from the use of blood that results in viral disease.73 The
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that these statutes could not be applied
retroactively.
What the opinion in this case does not state is that the legislature
specifically provided that the new legislation be applied prospectively
only. Thus, regardless of how the supreme court would have classified
this new statute,7 4 the legislature precluded any possible retroactive ap-
plication by providing that "[tihe provisions of this Article are intended
to be prospective in nature and shall not affect causes of action which
have arisen prior to the effective date of this Article. '75 This language
was not mentioned in the Faucheaux opinion, but it made the question
of retroactivity moot. Hence, Faucheaux carries very little weight. 76
Merely because an amended statute can be linked somehow to a
prior judicial decision does not necessarily mean that the amendment is
interpretive legislation and will apply retroactively. If retroactive appli-
cation of a statute would violate vested substantive rights, then the
statute can be applied prospectively only. The point of the above dis-
cussion is that, under Louisiana law, judicial decisions do not create
substantive rights. The Cahn v. Cahn77 case serves to illustrate the point.
In that decision, the supreme court held that an amended statute gov-
erning the partition of coowned property could not be retroactively
applied because the amendment created a substantive change in the law.
The amended statute in question was viewed as substantive rather than
interpretive.
The Cahn court dealt with a situation that had been interpreted
differently by both the trial court and the appellate court 78 before the
statute in question was amended. The trial court had held that Louisiana
Civil Code Article 543 barred a partition by licitation in this instance.
The appellate court reversed this decision, holding that this version of
article 543 did not bar a partition by licitation in this situation. Sometime
73. La. R.S. 9:2797 (Supp. 1988).
74. La. Civ. Code art. 6 (procedural or interpretive).
75. La. R.S. 9:2797 (Supp. 1988).
76. Faucheaux is a per curiam opinion, while Ardoin is a majority opinion, both
written by Justice Dennis. It is this author's belief that the majority's opinion is much
more significant for this analysis because the facts and circumstances of Ardoin, as
compared to that of Faucheaux, are much more in line with the pending question of
possible retroactive application of the new Act.
77. 468 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1985).
78. Id. at 1178.
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after the appellate court's decision, the legislature amended article 543
to allow a partition by licitation in this type of situation.
The Cahn court ruled that the amendment destroyed a substantive
right and therefore could not be applied retroactively. When the action
arose, noted the court, the coowner had a right to keep her property
free from partition by licitation under the express terms of the statute;
the wording of the amended statue would prohibit her from keeping
their property free from partition by licitation. 79 The elimination of the
right expressly provided by the statute when the action arose would
divest the defendant of a vested right, and the court correctly concluded
that the amendment could not have retroactive effects.
The court's decision in Cahn is not inconsistent with the proposition
that the new Act should not be retroactively applied. The situations are
readily distinguishable, because in Cahn, the issue concemed an amend-
ment to a Louisiana Civil Code article that, in effect, changed the
wording and the meaning of the article in question. Substantive rights
are vested by the express provisions of the Civil Code, and therefore
amendments to the express terms would not be applied retroactively.
The Act, on the other hand, is not an amendment to prior statutory
law; it is at most an amendment to prior jurisprudential rules. As the
courts have made so clear, substantive rights are not vested by judicial
interpretations. Because of these critical differences in the two situations,
the Cahn decision should not impede retroactive application of the new
Act.
Absent any legislative expression to the contrary, the retroactive
application of this statute will depend on whether or not it is classified
as substantive or interpretive legislation. As was expressed in the cases
presented in this section, when the legislature clarifies the meaning of
a law in response to a court's interpretation of that law, this clarification
has been viewed as interpretive and afforded retroactive application. No
substantive rights are created by judicial decisions, and legislation over-
ruling those decisions can be given retroactive application. 0
CONCLUSION: RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
The purpose of this comment has been to address the issue of
whether the new Products Liability Act should be applied retroactively
to causes of action arising before September 1, 1988. A basic two step
analysis consisting of legislative expression and Louisiana Civil Code
article 6 was used to determine if retroactive application of the Act is
the correct conclusion for this issue. Since there is no specific legislative
79. Id. at 1180.
80. See supra note 35.
1989]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
expression concerning the retroactive or prospective application of the
Act, it must be determined whether the Act is substantive, interpretive,
or procedural. Although the Act does alter six specific aspects of prior
jurisprudence on this issue, no substantive rights are created or destroyed.
The Act merely serves to codify law as it existed and alter a claimant's
burden of proof. In other instances, the Act interprets the law as it
should have been recognized before its promulgation.
If the Act is declared to be substantive, then it cannot be retroactively
applied. If, on the other hand, the Act is deemed to be procedural or
remedial, it will have both retroactive and prospective effects in accor-
dance with article 6 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The cases presented
in this comment, all consisting of different factual situations but logically
connected to this issue because of their analysis of the application of
newly enacted legislation, show that this Act should be viewed as in-
terpretive or procedural instead of as substantive.
The legislature could have easily resolved this issue had it desired
to do so. By creating this Act to overrule the Halphen decision, and
by rejecting the restrictive language that was proposed and originally
accepted, the question of retroactivity is placed in the hands of the
courts.
In light of the foregoing analysis and explanations, the Act should
be given retroactive application. The analogies to the legally similar cases
presented herein, along with the reasons behind the Act, are in strong
support of retroactive application. The legislature's intent was to not
prohibit retroactivity. All of the evidence available, in relation to the
relevant issues in this problem, leads to the conclusion that the new
Products Liability Act should be applied retroactively.
Charles Joseph Duhe, Jr.
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